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ABSTRACT 
Several researchers in happiness studies have called for an increased sociopolitical 
interest in indicators of societal happiness. However, recent evidence for the proposed 
paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggest that an increase in society’s perceived value of 
happiness may exert a detrimental, inverse influence on well-being. This notion is based on 
previous research demonstrating that manipulating participants to value happiness causes them to 
experience less positive emotions, compared to controls, when viewing positive film clips. 
Following the humanistic notion that the maximization of societal happiness is an advantageous 
sociopolitical endeavor, the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness present a 
psychological barrier that researchers must strive to understand and, ideally, overcome. 
Previous experimental research on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness has 
focused on participants’ emotionality as an operational definition of happiness. However, 
drawing from the Subjective Well-Being construct, emotionality is only one of several 
components of happiness.  Building from this Subjective-Well Being framework, this study 
expands upon previous research by investigating whether a valuing happiness manipulation 
influences participants’ emotionality while they contemplate their own happiness. To examine 
this, nineteen participants were divided into two groups, one which received a valuing happiness 
manipulation (n=9) and the others served as a control group (n=10), and instructed to 
contemplate their personal happiness for 45 seconds. To measure participants’ emotions during 
this task, facial electromyography data were collected from the corrugator supercilii and the 
zygomaticus major facial muscles, a measure that previous research suggests is sensitive to the 
emotional value of thought.  
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Results indicated that participants manipulated to value happiness did not experience 
significant differences in facial electromyography activation compared to controls. However, 
although non-significant, the correlation between facial electromyography activation and 
participants’ rating of happiness differed substantially for participants manipulated to value 
happiness (average r=.41 for corrugator, average r=-.09 for zygomaticus) and controls (average 
r=.-.29 for corrugator, average r=.14 for zygomaticus). The counterintuitive correlations for 
participants led to value happiness, despite not experiencing significant difference in the 
emotional value of the happiness contemplation task, provide preliminary evidence that these 
participants utilize the information retrieved from the contemplative stage in a qualitatively 
different way than controls when judging their own happiness. More specifically, the correlations 
for participants led to value happiness trend in the opposite direction of controls, demonstrating 
that increases in positive emotion during happiness contemplation actually are associated with 
lower scores on a self-report of happiness. This study suggests that the paradoxical effects of 
valuing happiness does not influence the retrieval of information when contemplating ones’ 
happiness, but may influence (in an apparently detrimental fashion) how this information is 
utilized when judging one’s happiness.  
Although the between-condition differences in correlations failed to reach statistical 
significance (more specifically, p=.09 for corrugator), this study provides preliminary evidence 
for the existence of a new dynamic of the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness that 
is novel to the happiness studies discourse. Limitations, implications, and future directions are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The U.S community believes that higher levels of happiness are a critical factor in 
determining the desirability of a life (King & Napa, 1998). In addition to being highly valued on 
the personal level, reviews of the happiness studies literature suggest that happy people are more 
successful, more creative, possess better coping capabilities, and are better work and societal 
citizens (Diener & Ryan, 2009; Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005). In response to its apparent 
benefits to society, some argue that nations should consider their citizen’s happiness an ultimate 
public policy goal (Veenhoven, 2004) and a leading social indicator measure (Oishi & Diener, 
2014); a philosophical utilitarian principle (Bentham, 1879) that is a stark contrast to the current 
international emphasis on GDP and GNP. Notably, the Eastern country of Bhutan has already 
adopted this emphasis on Gross National Happiness, and the apparent emerging interest in 
societal happiness at the international level is being paralleled by robust advancements in the 
scientific realm. 
In response to its promising and intriguing nature, the empirical study of happiness has 
boomed over the past 50 years and a new science of positive psychology has emerged (Seligman 
& Csikszentimihalyi, 2000). Contrasting the historical “negativity bias of traditional 
psychology,” researchers in positive psychology are interested in investigating human strengths, 
virtues, happiness, and potential in order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of 
human nature (Sheldon & King, 2001; p.216), as well as to foster the development of positive 
human characteristics. The advent of positive psychology has considerably contributed to growth 
of happiness studies, which now utilizes various multi- and interdisciplinary insights in order to 
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expand the scientific understanding of this topic. With these advancements, one can speculate 
that people may one day live in a world where the majority of its inhabitants are in a state of 
psychological flourishing. However, is this perhaps overoptimistic?  Is our current emphasis on 
happiness nothing more than a “modern obsession” (Burnett, 2011)? These are difficult, 
enormously complex questions to tackle; ones that are much too large for an undergraduate 
thesis. Instead, this work will focus on one factor that may eventually play a large role in this 
debate: the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness. 
The Paradoxical Effects of Valuing Happiness 
A desire to be happy is somewhat of a cultural universal. However, there is some 
evidence that valuing happiness too much can be detrimental and ironically counterproductive. 
Research conducted by Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, and Savino (2011) suggests that valuing 
happiness can be paradoxical; providing both correlational and experimental evidence that it can 
reduce the positivity of one’s emotional reactions. Corroborating these findings, a separate study 
found that valuing happiness is inversely related to positive emotion and satisfaction with life, 
and positively associated with negative emotions and depression (Catalino, Algoe & 
Fredrickson, 2014). The causal and correlational evidence for the paradoxical effects of valuing 
happiness introduce important considerations for the field of positive psychology. For instance, 
these results suggest that there may be both effective and ineffective ways for one to pursue 
happiness (Catalino, Algoe & Fredrickson, 2014). More importantly, the evidence for the 
paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggests that prospective utilitarian public policies may 
have unintended inverse effects on societal happiness if they additionally result in an increase in 
the perceived value of happiness. However, borrowing from the common idiomatic expression, 
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before we throw the baby out with the bath water, happiness studies should strive to further the 
understanding this phenomenon, and determine if and/or how this psychological barrier to 
increased societal happiness can be overcome. 
In the experimental proceedings of Mauss and colleague’s original work (2011), 
participants’ emotional reactions to a positive film clip were measured through implicit and 
explicit post-hoc measures of emotionality. To investigate the effect of valuing happiness, half of 
these participants received a sham newspaper article that manipulated the perceived value of 
happiness by elaborating on the importance of and benefits of maximized happiness, and the 
other half received control articles containing no mention of happiness. Results from both 
measures of emotion suggest that the manipulated participants experienced less positive 
emotional reactions to a positive film clip. Subsequent questioning demonstrated that 
participants’ disappointment at their own feelings mediated this effect. 
The present study expands upon the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness by 
investigating whether manipulating participants to value happiness affects the way they think 
about their own personal happiness; a subjectivist approach that is intended to complement and 
expand upon the previous research. More specifically, this study analyzes whether the valuing 
happiness manipulation validated in Mauss and colleagues’ original study causes participants to 
experience less positive emotion when contemplating their own happiness, which due to the 
relationship between emotion and cognition (reviewed later) would serve as an indicator that 
they are thinking less positive thoughts. In addition, this study analyzed whether the valuing 
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happiness manipulation causes participants to self-report that they are overall happier than 
controls. 
Before elaborating on this study, some constructs of interest will first be briefly reviewed. 
More specifically, this paper will first: a) discuss what happiness is, elaborating on the 
theoretical perspective utilized in this work, b) deliberate on theoretical conceptualizations of 
emotions, c) examine the notion of an affective value of thought, and d) explore proposed ways 
to measure the affective value of thought. 
What Is Happiness? 
Before studying the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, a working definition of 
happiness must first be established. This is perhaps easier said than done, as the complex 
construct of happiness has been contemplated and debated for centuries. To study happiness at 
the empirical level, a large and diverse set of measures has been created (see Veenhoven World 
Database of Happiness for an extensive list). Some of these measures focus solely on emotional, 
or hedonic, aspects of happiness (Kahneman, 1999), whereas others have included more 
eudemonic aspects, such as purpose and meaning in life (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964). 
However, some have suggested that neither of these perspectives is sufficient, and that happiness 
may be best conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon that includes aspects of both distinct 
categories (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Following this logic, some recent accounts of happiness have 
integrated these factors in order to formulate more comprehensive accounts of the construct 
(Seligman, 2002). In addition, others have maintained that maximum personal well-being is 
achieved through the pursuit of both eudemonic and hedonic factors (Huta & Ryan 2010; 
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Peterson, Park & Seligman, 2005). However, even with efforts to develop more comprehensive 
frameworks, the definition of happiness is still being debated and refined to this day (Delle Fave, 
Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick & Wissing, 2011).  
Subjective Well Being and Evaluative Judgments of Happiness 
Considering the multifaceted, contested nature of the happiness construct, pragmatically, 
it makes sense for researchers to hone in on more specific aspects of happiness, while 
simultaneous maintaining an awareness of the limited scope of these focused perspectives. This 
is the approach employed in this current paper, where concentration is placed upon a specific 
aspect of a more hedonic conceptualization of happiness, Subjective Well Being. This 
framework maintains that happiness consists of life satisfaction, positive emotion, and low levels 
of negative emotion (Diener, 2000), and conceptualizes happiness as a subjective phenomenon.  
While happiness researchers predominately utilize self-reports of global subjective well-
being, the cognitive components of happiness are equally as fascinating. For instance, although 
much has been learned about happiness over the years, how people assess and think about their 
own happiness is still a major unanswered question (Veenhoven, 1991). As the name implies, 
subjective well-being places a strong emphasis on the subjective nature of happiness. Therefore, 
in order to more comprehensively understand this construct, it is advantageous to understand the 
underlying processes that create this subjective lens. The analysis of the mental processes that 
inform global reports of subjective well-being is a perspective I refer to as an evaluative 
judgment of happiness. 
6 
 
As discussed by Schwarz and Strack (1999; p.61), “reports of subjective well-being 
(SWB) do not reflect a stable inner state of well-being. Rather, they are judgments that 
individuals form on the spot, based on information that is chronically or temporarily available at 
that point in time…” This notion of contextual reconstruction has received attention across the 
psychology discipline, possibly most notably in Frederick Bartlett’s discussions on memory 
(Bartlett & Bartlett, 1995). In this work, it is argued that memory cannot be replayed or retrieved, 
but only reconstructed at the time of remembering. Similarly, the notion of contextual 
reconstruction also has been elaborated upon in more general considerations of survey 
methodology (Groves et al., 2004). Here, it is argued that people do not constantly keep working 
representations of their beliefs, but rather are likely to base their answers on whatever 
considerations come to mind at the time. Adapted to the subjective happiness framework, the 
notion of contextual reconstruction suggests that people do not possess static representations of 
their global well-being, but rather utilize contextually-dependent cognitive processes to 
formulate conclusions and self-reports of their subjective happiness. 
The mental process that informs one’s answer to a survey question, such as “How happy 
are you?” has been conceptualized as a dynamic interplay between four discrete processes: 1) 
comprehension of the question, 2) retrieval of information, 3) judgment and estimation, and 4) 
reporting an answer (Groves et al., 2004). However, happiness researchers generally focus the 
majority of their energy on the last component of this model, with less emphasis on how 
participants retrieve information and make a judgment about their personal happiness (see Figure 
1). The evaluative judgment perspective, which focuses on these two intermediary processes, 
retrieval of information and judgment, illuminates the cognitive elements that inform subjective 
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reports of happiness; a perspective that previous research on the paradoxical effects of valuing 
happiness has yet to investigate.  
In the original work on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, happiness was 
operationalized as an emotion. However, while emotionality is certainly an important and 
necessary ingredient of subjective well-being (Myers & Diener, 1995), this research has thus far 
left the subjectivist component of subjective well-being unaddressed. This thesis investigates 
happiness from the evaluative judgment of happiness perspective; examining whether the 
paradoxical effects of happiness influence the mental processes that occur when people think 
about and evaluate whether they are happy. This was investigated by utilizing an objective, 
psychophysiological measure of the emotional value of thought: facial electromyography. In 
theory, if the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence participants’ emotions while 
reflecting upon their own happiness, facial electromyography will be able to non-obtrusively 
measure this effect. Before elaborating upon this psychophysiological measure of emotion, 
however, it is important to briefly review the theoretical foundation of emotion.  
Theoretical Accounts of Emotion 
Research on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggests that valuing happiness 
leads one to experience emotions that are less positive. Although this, at face value, seems rather 
straightforward, there is an ongoing debate within the affective sciences on exactly how to define 
an emotion. As stated by Fehr and Russell (1984; p.464), “Everyone knows what an emotion is, 
until asked to give a definition.” The debate over how to conceptualize emotion has raged for the 
past century and has (perhaps a bit overly dramatically) been recently referred to as “The 
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Hundred-Year Emotion War” (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). However, 
considering the importance of emotionality in more hedonic conceptualizations of happiness, this 
is an important development to follow. 
Based on common perception, the average person conceptualizes and reports emotions as 
discrete entities. For instance, one may tell a friend that he/she is excited during a visit to 
Disneyworld, or suggest that he/she is sad about failure in a course. Many of these discrete 
emotions, commonly referred to as “basic emotions” (Ekman, 1992), have been identified, and 
subcortical neural networks for some of them have been located (Panksepp & Biven, 2012). 
However, factor analyses of self-reported emotion often reveal that these intuitively discrete 
emotions often yield two factor dimensional models (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Perhaps the most 
popular of these models, James Russell’s Circumplex Model of Affect (1980), argues that 
emotions are represented on a two-dimensional circumplex affective structure. Russell’s 
affective structure, visualized as a grid, possesses a horizontal valence (i.e: positive, negative) 
axis, and a vertical arousal axis. The circumplex theory posits that the human emotional 
experience can be conceptualized as fluctuations along an affective grid, and it has been added 
that the discrete emotions that we report are socially constructed phenomenon informed by 
certain combinations of these affective values (Barrett, 2006). For example, the discrete emotion 
of excitement would be characterized as our socially constructed label of a moderate degree of 
positive affect and a moderately high degree of arousal, or alertness. Although many have 
investigated emotions as discrete entities, the circumplex model is currently receiving more 
support by both psychophysiological and self-report data in the literature (Mauss & Robinson, 
2009); although mixed-emotion research has pointed to some noteworthy flaws (Larsen & 
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McGraw, 2014) that support a less popular, alternative dimensional account of attitudes and 
emotion (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). While there are some flaws in the circumplex model of 
emotion, this conceptualization is still useful, popular in the affective sciences, and supported by 
the preponderance of evidence.  
In the present study, the emotions that participants experience while contemplating their 
happiness are examined; integrating past research’s sole focus on emotional components of 
happiness with the more subjective evaluative judgment perspective. However, before continuing 
there are a two underlying theoretical questions that deserve discussion: 1) Does cognition 
possess an affective value? 2) If so, it possible to quantify participants’ affective experiences 
while they are participating in introspective thought? 
The Affective Value of Thought 
Although cognition has traditionally been researched in an emotional vacuum, more 
recent advances demonstrate that a dynamic interplay exists between higher order cognition and 
emotion (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). For instance, there is 
accumulating evidence that affective states can be projected onto higher-level judgments 
(Forgas, 1995; Lench, Flores & Bench, 2011), and influence memory and cognitive processing 
styles (Ceci & Ornstein, 2014; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001; Lench, Flores & 
Bench, 2011). Furthermore, research on emotional regulation demonstrates that this interaction 
can be bidirectional, as various emotional regulation strategies (Gross, 1998), such as cognitive 
reappraisal, can be utilized to alter an emotional states.  
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In addition to its bidirectional relationship with emotion, I maintain that cognition also 
can be emotionally charged. In other words, cognition not only has the ability to regulate 
emotions; it also is capable of eliciting emotional reactions. Consider the following scenario: 
research participant Valerie comes into the lab for a study on how one’s affective state can 
influence various cognitive processes. To put Valerie in a negative affective state, the 
experimenter asks her to simply ruminate on a particular negative thought for 45 seconds: her 
own funeral. As the IRB would almost certainly interject, it may be unethical to ask Valerie to 
perform this emotional elicitation task, as she will likely get upset, uncomfortable, and 
potentially depressed. Similar, less evocative emotional elicitation strategies have been utilized 
in the past (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Velten, 1968), and it appears that thinking about certain 
topics elicit powerful affective responses. For example, both self-reported and physiological 
indicators of anger reveal that thinking about an angering experience elicits negative emotions, 
and that emotional regulation strategies attenuate these responses in such a way that is consistent 
with theories of cognitive reappraisal (Ray, Wilhelm & Gross, 2008). In addition, it is argued 
that working memory and emotion are reciprocally connected, and that verbal working memory 
tasks are associated with the experience of positive affect, and spatial working memory tasks are 
associated with the experience negative affect (Storbeck & Watson, 2014). Based on this 
reciprocal connection, it has been shown that these tasks are not only facilitated by their 
respective affective charges, but that they also are capable of eliciting these affective reactions 
when employed. Collectively, these reviewed studies support the notion that cognitive 
processing is both associated with and charged by emotion; indicating that mental thought 
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possesses an untapped emotional or affective value. However, for this postulate to be useful 
beyond theoretical considerations, it is practical to quantify this value.  
Borrowing from dimensional accounts of emotion, it would not be advantageous to 
search for indicators of “angry”, “sad”, or “excited” thinking. Instead, it is more feasible to 
investigate the emotional value of thought as varying along an affective structure. Based on this 
notion, researchers should focus their efforts on investigating and quantifying how positive vs. 
negative thought can be, or, in other words, the affective value of thought. Applied to the current 
study, this suggests that participants’ evaluative judgments of happiness will possess an affective 
value, and that, if the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness are confirmed, those who are led 
to value happiness will possess a less positive affective value of thought than controls. 
Measuring Affect 
There are many ways to measure affectivity, including self-reports, autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) activation, startle response magnitudes, electroencephalography, functional 
imaging, positron emission tomography, vocal characteristics, facial behavior, and observer 
ratings. To measure valence or how positive vs. negative an affective experience is, self-reports, 
ANS measures, and facial behaviors have been determined to be appropriate (Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009). Despite several options, this study focuses on the psychophysiological 
measurement of facial electromyography, a methodology that is capable of objectively 
distinguishing between positive and negative affect (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch & Kim, 1986).  
Since the present experiment included an introspective thought period that lasts 45 
seconds, it was ideal to gather a continuous measure of valence; a measurement that self-reports 
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cannot necessarily facilitate without introducing potentially confounding cognitive processing. 
Facial electromyography is therefore an ideal measure for the present study because it is 
continuous, objective, and non-obtrusive (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch & Kim, 1986). While 
triangulating this measure with self-reports is certainly advantageous, these reports could 
interrupt streams of introspective thought, potentially affecting the cognitive processes of 
interest. 
Facial Electromyography as a Measure of the Affective Value of Thought 
In his writings on the expression of emotions in man and animals, Charles Darwin (1872) 
created an influential contribution to psychology that spurred an interest in how emotion is 
represented in the face. Following his assertion that human facial expressions reflexively 
communicate a message about one’s emotional state of mind, researchers began developing 
methods to analyze this facial muscle movement in order to make inferences about a target’s 
emotional experience. Facial electromyography, which objectively quantifies the activation of a 
facial muscle of interest, has emerged as one of these leading methodologies. 
In their seminal article, Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, and Kim (1986) determined that facial 
electromyography can provide objective and continuous probes of affective valence. Notably, 
they demonstrated that this measure is sensitive to minor changes in facial activation that 
observer rating systems, such as the Facial Affect Coding System (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997), 
often cannot identify. While people can exert a conscious and intentional control over many of 
these facial muscle movements (i.e: when intentionally smiling to be polite), this facial muscle 
activation, as originally discussed by Darwin (1872), often occurs as a reflexive reaction to an 
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affective reaction. For example, when viewing images of racial minorities, implicitly racist 
participants experience significant activation over frowning muscles, despite being unaware of 
this activation and explicitly denying racist attitudes (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997). Facial 
electromyography, therefore, is a desirable methodology for the present study because it can 
objectively tap into participant’s affective reactions even if they are unaware that these reactions 
are occurring and/or these reactions are below the visual threshold of observer ratings.  
While there are several muscles of interest in facial electromyography, the ones most 
appropriate for determining affective valence are the corrugator supercilii and the zygomaticus 
major. The corrugator supercilii is a muscle located in the brow region that is responsible for 
pulling the brow inward to create what is often considered a frown. This muscle is inversely 
influenced by positive and negative affect, the former inhibiting and the later potentiating 
activity over the muscle in a linear fashion (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Larsen, 
Norris & Cacioppo; 2003). In other words, positive affect decreases corrugator activation and 
negative affect increases corrugator activation.  
The second muscle of interest, the zygomaticus major, is located in the cheek region and 
is responsible for pulling the lips towards the ear to create what is often considered a smile. This 
muscle has increased activation and a j-shaped quadratic relationship with the experience of 
positive affect (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Larsen, Norris & Cacioppo, 2003). 
Although some have failed to replicate the quadratic relationship between zygomaticus major 
activation and affect (Robinson, Cinciripini, Carter, Lam & Wetter, 2007), the preponderance of 
evidence still supports this association.  
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Facial electromyography has been utilized in a large variety of experimental settings 
where self-reports cannot be relied upon. However, it is less extensively used to investigate the 
affective value of thought, despite results suggesting that it is certainly viable. For instance, in a 
study on depression, Teasdale and Bacroft (1977) tracked corrugator activity while six depressed 
participants thought 10 happy and 10 sad 30-second thoughts in randomized orders. Within-
participant comparisons demonstrated that corrugator activity is generally higher when thinking 
negative, as opposed to positive, thoughts, although these differences did not always reach 
statistical significance. Given the small, six participant sample size utilized in this experiment, it 
seems that facial electromyography may be a fairly strong measure of the affective value of 
thought, but that relatively larger sample sizes are necessary in order to reliably reach statistical 
significance.  
A similar study was conducted by Schwartz and colleagues (1996), in which both 
depressed and non-depressed participants were asked to mentally re-experience happy, sad, 
angry, and “typical day” situations while facial electromyography data were collected. For non-
depressed participants, the corrugator experienced significant deactivation during the happy 
thoughts, but non-significant activation during sad, angry, and “typical day” thoughts. The 
depressed participants, on the other hand, did not experience significant corrugator deactivation 
during the happy thoughts, but did experience significant activation during the sad and angry 
thoughts. Combining the data from the non-depressed and depressed participants, the corrugator 
experienced significant activation/deactivation during happy, sad, and angry thoughts. These 
activation patterns are consistent with previous research on facial electromyography as well as 
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cognitive theories of depression, although these researchers seemed to focus on a discrete, as 
opposed to dimensional, conceptualization of emotion.  
Finally, in an experiment investigating persuasion, Cacioppo and Petty (1979; p.2181) 
noted that “patterns of subtle facial muscle changes reflected the affective nature of the cognitive 
responding before and during the message” (also see Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Taken together, 
these results confirm that mental thought can elicit affective responses, and that facial 
electromyography is sensitive, to a certain degree, to these changes. Although quantifying this 
affective value of thought is uncommon, these results suggest that, with respect to the current 
study, it is certainly feasible. 
In the present study, facial electromyography was utilized to determine whether valuing 
happiness influences the affective value of thought of participants’ evaluative judgments of 
happiness (Figure 1.) In line with previous research on the paradoxical effects of valuing 
happiness (Mauss et al., 2011) it was hypothesized that participants manipulated to value 
happiness would experiences less positive emotions, compared to controls, when contemplating 
their happiness. In addition, it was hypothesized that participants manipulated to value 
happiness, compared to controls, would self-report higher levels of overall happiness. 
 
 
  
16 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
In this current study, facial electromyography was utilized to quantify the affective value 
of thought during a 45 second evaluative judgment of happiness. It was hypothesized that the 
valuing happiness manipulation utilized in Mauss and colleague’s original study (2011) would 
create less positive thinking compared to controls. This manipulation is a sham article that 
appears to be discussing broadcasting companies’ interest in viewer’s emotionality, although it 
consistently makes statements about the importance of happiness such as “…as is well-known, 
people who report higher than normal levels of happiness experience benefits in their social 
relationships, professional success, and overall health and well-being.” Unbeknownst to 
participants, this sham article is intended to increase participant’s perceived value of happiness, 
and has been validated as effective in their original study. 
Asking a participant to consider their happiness is a contextually dependent, multi-phased 
cognitive process. The evaluative judgment perspective adopted in the current study focuses on 
the intermediary processes of selecting information and integrating this information to make a 
judgment. If the valuing happiness manipulation negatively impacts participants, a negative bias 
in the information selection and judgment procedures would be expected. In this present study, 
facial electromyography data was collected while participants contemplated their happiness; a 
task that is most closely parallels the information-selection phase of an evaluative judgment of 
happiness (see Figure 1.) In accordance with the notion of an affective value of thought, a 
paradoxical effect of valuing happiness during this task would be characterized by increased 
corrugator and/or decreased zygomatic activation.  
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Participants  
To be eligible for this study, students had to be over 18 and, due to the potential for facial 
hair to confound the electromyography signal, clean shaven. In total, twenty two undergraduates 
(19 female, 3 male, mean age=19.91, SD=3.37) participated in this study. Due to a combination 
of technical difficulties and incorrect setup procedures, three participants were excluded from 
analyses.  
Materials and Procedure 
Facial electromyography was utilized to determine whether a valuing happiness 
manipulation influenced the affective value of thought during an evaluative judgment of 
happiness. This facial muscular activation was sampled at 1,000 Hz via a Biopac system (Model 
MP35) and processed in its accompanying BSL Pro software. To enable the acquisition of facial 
electromyography data, two SS1LA lead adaptors were utilized. All hardware and software was 
purchased from BioPac Systems Inc. (BioPac Systems, Inc., Aero Camino Goleta, CA, US.)  
All facial electromyography data acquisition was performed largely parallel to the 
guidelines set forth by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Upon arriving to the study, participants 
first reviewed an informed consent document explaining that a male experimenter would be 
cleaning and attaching electrodes to various sites on their body. Afterwards to facilitate comfort, 
participants were introduced to the Biopac machine (BioPac Systems, Inc., Aero Camino Goleta, 
CA, US), which was explained to be a system that measures electrical currents in the body. 
Afterwards, participants underwent facial electromyography preparation procedures. 
18 
 
To ensure a clean signal with stabilized conductivity and limited artifacts, the electrode 
contact sites were first cleaned and abraded with an isopropyl alcohol skin-prep pad. Afterward, 
five 4 mm silver-silver chloride electrodes (four shielded EL254S and one unshielded EL254), 
were filled with electrode conductive gel (GEL100)  and attached to the corrugator supercilii, 
zygomaticus major, and ground contact sites recommended in Fridlund & Cacioppo’s guidelines 
(1986). At this point, participants were informed that the Biopac would be collecting data 
throughout the experiment, and that, in order to maintain a clean signal, they would have to try to 
minimize their head and body movement when not completing surveys or questionnaires. 
After confirming participant comfort, participants were briefly trained to perform 
Maximum Voluntary Contractions, which establish the maximum muscular activation in each of 
the two muscles of interest. Afterward, they performed two maximum voluntary contractions for 
both the corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscles, although some participants were 
asked to perform a few extra maximum voluntary contractions due to technological glitches in 
the acquisition file. After performing the maximum voluntary contractions, facial 
electromyography data were collected over a one minute baseline period. After establishing this 
baseline, participants were instructed to begin the experiment on a laptop in front of them.  
In an online questionnaire format, basic demographic information was collected from the 
participants. Afterward, those in the “valuing happiness” condition received a sham article 
intended to increase the perceived value of happiness, whereas those in the control condition 
received no manipulation. This sham article can be found in Appendix D, and has been 
previously validated in Mauss and colleagues’ (2011) original study. 
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Afterward, all participants were instructed to contemplate their own personal happiness 
for an experimenter-timed 45 seconds. This time period started only once participants 
acknowledged that they were ready. After this contemplation period, participants then filled out 
an 11-point overall happiness questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, participants were fully 
debriefed. (Appendix F) 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
Facial Electromyography Data Processing 
In line with the proposed guidelines in Fridlund & Cacioppo (1986), the facial 
electromyography signals were first passed through a 10 Hz and 500 Hz bandpass filter. 
Afterward, the data points from the baseline, maximum voluntary contractions, and thought time 
periods were rectified (absolute value) and smoothed (moving average), a procedure that is in 
line with the guidelines of facial electromyography (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986).  
While many researchers compare the difference between baseline and manipulation 
muscle activation, the use of standardization techniques based on maximum voluntary 
contractions is recommended in Fridlund and Cacioppo’s (1986) guidelines. Teaching 
participants to perform maximum voluntary contractions of facial muscles allows researchers to 
determine and account for individual differences in facial muscle strength in their analyses 
(Halaki & Ginn, 2012). With this technique, a percentage of total maximum activation is 
rendered, and the differences between baseline activation and manipulation activation 
percentages are the unit of analysis.  
In this experiment, participants contemplated their own happiness for 45 seconds. 
Previous research examining the affective value of thought over time has divided up these time 
period into smaller units of analysis (see Teasdale & Bacroft, 1977). The rationale for this 
procedure is based on the premise that some emotional reactions may occur quickly, and that a 
significant emotional reaction that happens within, for example, the first 5 seconds, may be 
rendered non-significant if no other reactions occur in the rest of the thought period. Therefore, 
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the 45 second thought period that participants underwent was separated into nine, 5 second 
intervals. Afterward, for each interval, the differences between the percentage of activation 
during the personal happiness-contemplation portion of the experiment and the percentage of 
activation during baseline were calculated. 
Corrugator Supercilii Activation during Happiness Contemplation 
A series of Shapiro-Wilk tests conducted on the processed differences in corrugator 
activation in the nine intervals determined that the majority of these distributions was non-
normal. Coupled with the small sample sizes in each condition, this warranted the use of 
nonparametric statistical procedures. Therefore, a series of Independent Samples Mann-Whitney 
tests, the rough nonparametric equivalent of an independent sample t-test, was performed; 
comparing changes in corrugator activation during the happiness contemplation task between 
participants in the Valuing Happiness condition and those in the Control condition. As 
represented in Table 1, results suggested that no significant differences in corrugator activation 
existed between the valuing happiness and control conditions (average p =.32). 
Although a visual inspection of standard deviations suggests that there may be an 
interesting between-condition difference, a series of Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances 
suggest there were no significant difference between the variance of the control and 
manipulation condition in every time interval (average p= .70).  
Considering that males are generally less facially reactive in emotional experiences than 
females (Thunberg & Dimberg, 2000), it is possible that the few male participants skewed the 
results. To examine this, the Independent Samples Mann-Whitney tests were re-rerun with the 
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exclusion of the male participants. Excluding the male participants did not substantially lower 
the p-value of these analyses, and all between-condition differences remained below statistical 
significance. 
Zygomaticus Major Activation during Happiness Contemplation 
A series of Shapiro-Wilk tests conducted on the processed differences of the nine 
intervals demonstrated that the majority of these distributions was normal, as opposed to the non-
normal distributions of the corrugator data. Therefore, a series of independent samples t- tests 
was performed. As represented in Table 2, results suggested that no significant differences in 
zygomaticus activation existed between the valuing happiness and control conditions (average 
p=.33). These findings were also corroborated by a series of Independent Samples Mann-
Whitney tests (average p=.35). 
Once again, although a visual inspection of standard deviations suggests that there may 
be an interesting between-condition difference, a series of Levene’s Test for Equality of 
Variances suggested there were no significant difference between the variance of the control and 
manipulation condition in every time interval (average p= .18).  
Considering that males are generally less facially reactive in emotional experiences than 
females (Thunberg & Dimberg, 2000), it is possible that the few male participants skewed the 
results. To examine this, the Independent Samples Mann-Whitney tests were re-rerun with the 
exclusion of the male participants. Excluding these male participants did not substantially lower 
the p-value of these analyses, and all between-condition differences remained below statistical 
significance. 
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11-Point Happiness Rating and Corrugator Supercilii Activation 
It was hypothesized that participants’ facial electromyography activation during their 
evaluative judgment of happiness task would correlate with their reports of happiness on an 11-
point scale. To test this, a series of Pearson Correlational analyses were conducted on the 
processed differences in corrugator supercilii activation and participant self-reports on the 11-
point happiness scale. Since previous analyses suggested that no significant differences in 
between-condition activation existed during the contemplation task, these correlation analyses 
were first run with the data combined from both conditions; exploring whether each 5 second 
interval of processed activation correlated with participants’ reports of happiness. Results 
suggested that no significant correlations existed between each 5 second interval of processed 
corrugator activation and participants’ reports of happiness (average r=.07, average p=.74). 
These analyses also were separately re-run within each condition, with results for both the 
control (average r=.-.29, average p=.41) and the manipulation condition (average r=.41, average 
p=.29) failing to reach significance.  
As a exploratory analysis, a one-sided comparison of Fisher r-to-z transformed 
correlation coefficients was utilized to assess whether the large difference between the two 
conditions’ correlations was statistically significant. Results suggested that this difference trends 
towards significance (p=.09). 
11-Point Happiness Rating and Zygomaticus Major Activation 
A similar series of Pearson Correlational analyses was conducted on the processed 
differences in zygomaticus major activation and participant self-reports on the 11-point 
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happiness scale. Results from the combined-condition analyses suggested that no significant 
correlations existed (average r=.02, average p=.82) between the processed zygomaticus major 
activation and participants’ reports of happiness. These analyses also were separately re-run with 
each condition, with results for both the control (average r=.14, average p=.69) and the 
manipulation (average r=-.09, average p=.64) condition failing to reach significance.  
As an exploratory analysis, a one-sided comparison of Fisher r-to-z transformed 
correlation coefficients was utilized to assess whether the difference between the two conditions’ 
correlations was statistically significant. Results suggested that this difference was not 
statistically significant (.34). 
Analysis of Between-Condition Difference in 11-Point Happiness Ratings  
It was hypothesized that participants who were manipulated to value happiness would 
report different scores on the happiness rating than controls. A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality 
demonstrated that one of these conditions (manipulation) was not normally distributed (p=.03). 
Coupled with the small sample size, this warranted the use of a nonparametric procedure. 
Therefore, an Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was performed. Results suggest that 
there were no differences in the self-reported happiness of controls and those manipulated to 
value happiness (p=.53). 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
It was hypothesized that the valuing happiness manipulation adopted from the original 
investigation on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness (Mauss et al., 2011) would cause 
participants to experience less positive emotions, compared to controls, when contemplating 
their personal happiness. However, facial electromyography data collected from both the 
corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major facial muscle sites failed to support this hypothesis. 
This finding suggests that valuing happiness does not influence how positive versus negative 
ones thoughts are when contemplating their happiness.  
While there is no evidence for between-condition differences in the emotions experienced 
during the happiness-contemplation phase, there are notable between-condition differences in the 
associations between facial electromyography activation during this phase and later self-reports 
of happiness.  For the control condition controls (average r=.-.29 for corrugator, average r=.14 
for zygomaticus), both of these correlations trend in an intuitive way; with decreases in 
corrugator activation (negative affect) and increases in zygomaticus activation (positive affect) 
being positively associated with self-reported happiness. These associations make sense; if one 
experiences more positive affect when contemplating happiness, he or she likely is a happier 
person. However, for the participants manipulated to value happiness (average r=.41 for 
corrugator, average r=-.09 for zygomaticus), the associations trend in the opposite direction, 
wherein increases in positive affect during the contemplation stage are associated with lower 
ratings of overall happiness. Although the tested between-condition differences in these 
correlations do not meet the often accepted .05 p-value standard (.09 for corrugator supercilii, .34 
for zygomaticus major), we should be careful to avoid the .05 “cliff effect” drop in confidence 
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when p-values exceed the accepted .05 threshold (Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963). Considering the 
extremely small sample size in the present study, it would be rash to dismiss the between-
condition difference in corrugator activation and happiness self-report associations that trends 
towards significant despite a limited amount of data points. In short, although the valuing 
happiness does not significantly influence the emotional content generated during the retrieval 
phase of the evaluative judgment of happiness, it appears that this manipulation may impact how 
the generated information is utilized in the judgment of personal happiness. 
Results from this study provide preliminary evidence that the paradoxical effects of 
valuing happiness manifest within the judgment, as opposed to retrieval, phase of an evaluative 
judgment of happiness. Although largely speculative, there are two feasible explanations for why 
the valuing happiness manipulation did not seemingly influence participants’ emotionality while 
contemplating their happiness. The first speculation is that the lack of differences may derive 
from differences in the emotional regulation strategies afforded by the original study’s film 
viewing paradigm and the current study’s evaluative judgment of happiness paradigm, which 
may have resulted in ceiling effects in the emotionality experienced during the happiness 
contemplation task. The second explanation is that these lack of differences may be mediated by 
the differences in the cognitive load demanded by the two tasks. 
Emotional Regulation  
The lack of between-condition differences in the happiness contemplation task may be 
due to the emotional regulation strategies afforded by this task. Whereas the emotional film clip 
task utilized in the previous studies did not afford any emotional regulation tasks, there is a 
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myriad of emotional regulation strategies that participants in the current study could have 
employed while contemplating their happiness.   
In theory, to increase how affectively pleasant an emotional response is, people can, and 
sometimes do, employ positive emotion up-regulation strategies (Parrott, 1993; Gross, Richards 
& John, 2006). Emotional up-regulation strategies are characterized by savoring, intentionally 
increasing the frequency of, or enhancing one’s positive emotional experiences (Tugade & 
Fredrickson, 2007). In addition to these more established strategies, recent research has 
demonstrated that the up-regulation of positive emotions during the viewing of positive picture 
also is possible when participants intentionally increase their immersion in the image (Pavlov, 
Reva, Loktev, Tumyalis, Korenyok & Aftanas, 2014). However, this emotional up-regulation 
occurred only after participants practiced and were trained on how to perform this strategy. So 
far, though, there is no evidence that participants have the ability or the natural tendency to 
actively employ these up-regulation strategies during film or image viewing without 
experimenter training or prompt cues. Therefore, it is likely that the participants in the original 
study who reported feelings of disappointment towards their emotional reactions were unable to 
upregulate their affective experiences.  
On the other hand, in the current study, participants were asked to contemplate their own 
happiness; a task over which they could exercise more cognitive control. In contrast to the 
emotional film clip paradigm, participants can presumably savor a particular thought, 
intentionally increase the frequency of positive thoughts, enhance the emotional experience of a 
thought by forcing smiling behavior, and/or utilize cognitive reappraisal strategies when 
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encountering negative thoughts during their mental contemplations of personal happiness 
(Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). In fact, intentional smiling behavior by a few participants was 
observed in this study. Therefore, the evaluative judgment of happiness paradigm utilized in the 
present study likely resulted in ceiling effects, as all participants likely intentionally chose to 
think positive thoughts and exercise positive up-regulation strategies when necessary. As 
opposed to the film clip participants who may have experienced disappointment at their partially 
uncontrollable affective experiences, participants in the current study could have feasibly 
employed positive up-regulation strategies to counteract any feelings of emotional inadequacy or 
disappointment.  
Cognitive Load  
Alternatively, the converging results may be attributed to differences in the extent of 
cognitive processing that each of these tasks demanded. Compared to an evaluation of one’s 
subjective happiness, a film clip is a more passive experience that requires less mental effort 
from participants. Therefore, participants presumably have ample cognitive resources to assess 
and experience disappointment at their own affective experiences. However, working memory is 
not an infinite resource (Miller, 1956), and contemplating one’s happiness is presumably a more 
demanding cognitive task than viewing a video. Therefore, while reflecting upon their happiness 
in the present study, it is possible that participants did not possess enough residual working 
memory to simultaneously consider the value of happiness, consciously reflect upon their 
affective experience, and/or experience disappointment at these reactions. Therefore, the current 
study’s paradigm may not have allowed enough residual working memory to employ the 
cognitive process that is previously theorized to mediate the paradoxical effects of valuing 
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happiness: disappointment at one’s own emotional reaction to the experimental task (Mauss et 
al., 2011). However, the fact that differences arose in the judgment task, which is presumable an 
equally as demanding cognitive task suggest that this alternative explanation is unlikely. 
Limitations 
While this study provides some preliminary insight into a novel aspect of the paradoxical 
effects of valuing happiness, there are some limitations associated with the present study. For 
instance, in the original study on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, the true nature of 
the study was not disclosed to participants during the informed consent proceedings. Instead, 
participants were led to believe that they were partaking in a study that was interested in 
television programming. Although both the original and present studies both utilized the same 
valuing happiness manipulation, the present study’s informed consent procedure (Appendix E) 
did not contain the same degree of deception. Instead, the purpose of the study was explained in 
truthful, but ambiguous terms. It is therefore possible that the lack of a consistent deception 
allowed some participants to realize the sham nature of the manipulation article. Since the 
current study did not employ any manipulation checks, there is no way to address the validity of 
this potential limitation. However, considering that the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness 
seemingly manifested itself when participants’ judges their own happiness, it appears that this 
lack of deception was permissible.  
 Another limitation of this study was that the valuing happiness manipulation, although 
previously validated, was not specifically geared towards the task utilized in the present study. 
Instead, the manipulation specifically emphasizes the importance of maximizing moment-to-
moment emotionality, as opposed to one’s overall sense of life satisfaction, perceived meaning in 
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life, or global happiness. Therefore, it was difficult to assess whether the manipulation truly was 
appropriate for this experiment. Furthermore, in the original study, participants in the control 
condition received a sham article that emphasized the importance of accurate judgments instead 
of happiness, whereas in the current study a pure, no control group article was utilized. While 
there is no reason to believe that this could have influenced results, the differences in control 
groups could be considered a potential limitation. 
In addition, participants in the current study may have realized that the experimenter was 
interested in facial muscle movement, due to the fact that electrodes were clearly attached to the 
face. Previous experiments have tried to address this limitation by attaching electrodes to 
additional irrelevant contact sites, such as the head and neck, in order to disguise the 
experimenter’s true variables of interest. However, this tactic was not utilized in this experiment, 
and there were no manipulation checks to assess whether participants knew that facial activity 
was the variable of interest. Notably, however, before participating, all participants 
acknowledged that they were unfamiliar with facial electromyography procedure. In addition, 
during debriefing procedures, some participants serendipitously stated that they were surprised 
that this procedure was capable, to some extent, of probing their emotional reactions. 
Another limitation of the present study was the fact that participants performed maximum 
voluntary contractions (MVCs) prior to beginning the experiment, which may have introduced 
fatigue during the following baseline collection procedures. Future research interested in 
utilizing MVC standardization procedures should consider saving this procedure for the end of 
the experiment. 
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 An additional potential criticism of this study is that participants in the manipulation 
condition had more time to habituate to the facial electromyography sensors than those in the 
control condition. This criticism is based off the fact that the sham article manipulation gave 
participants an extra 20-40 seconds to habituate to the sensors. Although there appears to be no 
work on how long it takes a participant to habituate to facial electromyography electrodes 
attachment, due to the time intensive nature of set-up , MVC recordings, and baseline readings, it 
is maintained that all participants, regardless of whether they received this short manipulation, 
had ample time to habituate to the electrodes placed on their face. 
In addition to these methodological limitations, the current study utilized a small sample 
size; with approximately 10 participants in each condition. It is therefore very difficult to achieve 
statistical significance, and it is possible that Type II errors exist. 
Future Directions 
“Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you’ll land among the stars” is a quote often 
attributed to motivational speaker Les Brown. Considering the fact that stars are actually further 
away from Earth than the moon, I propose a slight amendment that is more suiting for this thesis: 
“Shoot for the stars. Even if you come up short, you might land on the moon.” At the University 
of Central Florida, where this thesis work was performed, “Reach for the Stars” is the official 
school slogan. In many ways, this undergraduate thesis was a reach for the stars; it utilized a 
unique perspective of happiness (evaluative judgments) in a novel paradigm (happiness 
contemplation) with difficult psychophysiological methodology (facial electromyography.) That 
being said, a review of the limitations of the thesis suggest that the execution of the study was far 
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from perfect. However, while the study’s execution may have not made it to the metaphorical 
stars, I maintain that it certainly landed on our metaphorical moon, as the results of this study 
uncovered preliminary evidence for a novel manifestation of the paradoxical effects of valuing 
happiness. Due to the small sample size, this difference did not quite reach statistical 
significance. However, future research should strongly consider following up on this promising 
insight by running the experiment with a larger participant population. 
In addition to a potentially novel insight, several lessons were learned from this execution 
of this study. For example, Maximum Voluntary Contractions (MVCs) were utilized to 
standardize participants’ facial electromyography activation, which, in theory, should account for 
individual differences in facial muscle strength and reduce between-participant variation. 
Although the usage of MVC’s is common in more general electromyography investigations (i.e.: 
ones concerned with muscles such as the bicep) and are discussed in Fridlund and Cacioppo’s 
(1986) guidelines for facial electromyography, the use of this particular standardization 
technique still is uncommon in facial electromyography methodology. Future studies should 
examine whether this standardization procedure effectively reduces between-participant variation 
in facial electromyography activation, and if so, investigate the most effective way to include this 
procedure in an experiment. In the present study, participants performed MVC’s in the beginning 
of the study. However, in hindsight, employing this procedure in the beginning of an experiment 
has some limitations. For starters, teaching participants to perform MVC’s may inadvertently 
lead participants to understand that the experimenter is interested in facial expressions. Second, 
these MVC’s can fatigue the facial muscles, potentially confounding any measure taken directly 
after the procedure. In the present study, participants’ baseline measures were collected shortly 
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after they performed their MVCs, meaning that their baseline activation may have been lowered 
by muscle fatigue. Based on consideration of these two limitations, it may be advantageous to 
collect MVC’s at the end of a study. Saving this procedure for the end of the experiment may 
ensure that participants are not aware of the experimenter’s interest in facial expressions, and 
that the muscles of interest are not unnecessarily fatigued before the beginning of the 
experiment. 
 This study focused on facial electromyography activation during the retrieval component 
of the evaluative judgment of happiness. Results suggested that no significant difference in facial 
electromyography excited, although this activation correlated quite differently between the 
manipulation and control conditions. The difference between these correlations is interesting 
because it suggests that participants who are manipulated to value happiness may utilize the 
retrieved information in a different way than controls during the judgment phase of the 
evaluative judgment of happiness. While this finding is interesting, there is a lack of 
understanding on how exactly the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence 
participants’ cognitive processes in these conditions, and how these can be potentially overcome. 
Future research may find it advantageous to collect facial electromyography during this 
judgment portion as well, as this will lead to greater insight into how this information is being 
utilized. In addition, future research should consider think-aloud techniques during evaluative 
judgments of happiness, which will provide a qualitatively rich insight into this cognitive 
process. Last, future research should focus on how the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness 
can be potentially overcome. 
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Considering the idea that happiness is a multifaceted construct, and that affectivity is only 
one of it factors, future researchers should continue to investigate the paradoxical effects of 
valuing happiness from varied conceptualizations of happiness, such as ones that emphasize 
eudemonic, as opposed to purely hedonic, aspects of the construct. For example, one may 
question whether the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence participants’ 
sense meaning in life, life satisfaction, or perception of “balance.” In addition, future research 
may consider a more thorough degree of participant deception and a larger sample size.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of the study was to determine whether manipulating participants to value 
happiness causes them to experience less positive emotion when mentally contemplating their 
own happiness; a phenomenon referred to as “the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness” 
(Mauss et al., 2011). To nonobtrusively and continuously probe participant emotionality while 
they thought about their own happiness, facial electromyography was utilized. Results indicated 
that there were no significant differences in either corrugator or zygomaticus muscle activation 
between participants manipulated to value happiness and controls. Therefore, it is concluded that 
the valuing happiness manipulation did not influence the positivity or negativity of participants’ 
emotions when they contemplated their happiness. 
Although participants’ did not significantly differ in the emotional content of their 
thought during the retrieval-based contemplation of happiness, results demonstrated that the 
correlations between corrugator supercilii activation and participants’ ratings of happiness 
differed markedly between those who were manipulated to value happiness and those who 
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served as controls (p=.09). Although a small sample size inhibited this difference from reaching 
statistical significance, these results provide preliminary evidence that the paradoxical effects of 
valuing happiness may influence this judgment process in a negative way. This particular insight 
points to a unique, potentially novel dynamic of the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, 
suggesting that it not only influence participants’ emotionality, but also how they subjectively 
evaluative their overall happiness.  
While increased personal happiness is related to a myriad of beneficial outcomes (Diener 
& Ryan 2009; Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005), it is important for researchers to consider 
and systematically research whether a societal emphasis on happiness can be detrimental. While 
utilitarian principles and political interests in societal happiness intuitively seem like admirable 
endeavors that would likely garner significant public support, evidence for the paradoxical 
effects of valuing happiness warns that, under certain circumstances, these endeavors may be 
self-destructive. Happiness researchers should continue to take this notion seriously, and strive to 
understand the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness to a fuller extent. A deeper 
understanding of the paradoxical effects will not only shed light on this interesting psychological 
phenomenon, but also potentially uncover ways in which this psychological barrier to increased 
societal happiness can be overcome.  
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APPENDIX A: FIGURE 1 
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Figure 1 
A simple model of the survey response process, with a distinction of the scope of the evaluative 
judgment of happiness perspective. Adapted from Groves et al., 2004. 
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APPENDIX B: TABLE 1 
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Table 1 
Processed Corrugator Supercilii Activation during Happiness Contemplation Task 
 Control Manipulation  
 M SD M SD p-value 
0-5 second .005 .031 -.006 .046 .60 
5-10 second .007 .033 -.005 .033 .24 
10-15 second .007 .033 -.002 .033 .45 
15-20 second .011 .034 -.002 .032 .11 
20-25 second .010 .034 -.002 .03 .21 
25-30 second .009 .032 -.002 .026 .28 
30-35 second .01 .032 -.004 .028 .18 
35-40 second .008 .032 -.001 .03 .40 
40-45 second .011 .034 .003 .025 .36 
Note. For each five second increment, the unit of analysis was calculating by finding the average 
difference between corrugator supercilii activation during the task and during the baseline. 
Before this calculation was performed, the raw signal was rectified, smoothed, and standardized 
based off the average of participants’ Maximum Voluntary Contractions. To analyze the 
difference between conditions, independent sample t-tests were performed. 
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Table 2 
Processed Zygomaticus Major Activation during Happiness Contemplation Task 
 Control Manipulation  
 M SD M SD p-value 
0-5 second -.043 .095 -.013 .055 .42 
5-10 second -.049 .093 -.014 .054 .34 
10-15 second -.05 .094 -.015 .048 .32 
15-20 second -.05 .092 -.014 .049 .31 
20-25 second -.051 .091 -.016 .054 .34 
25-30 second -.049 .088 -.006 .061 .24 
30-35 second -.05 .086 -.002 .06 .18 
35-40 second -.05 .086 -.003 .06 .19 
40-45 second -.05 .081 .001 .059 .14 
Note. For each five second increment, the unit of analysis was calculating by finding the average 
difference between zygomaticus major activation during the task and during the baseline. Before 
this calculation was performed, the raw signal was rectified, smoothed, and standardized based 
off the average of participants’ Maximum Voluntary Contractions. To analyze the difference 
between conditions, independent sample t-tests were performed. 
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APPENDIX D: VALUING HAPPINESS MANIPULATION 
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“As a product of psychological research on well-being, broadcasting companies are trying to 
evaluate the programming they offer to the public. Historically, television programming has been 
evaluated with respect to decency or information content. As a result of hefty losses in revenue, 
there has been a push by television networks for empirical study of other effects that 
programming has on viewers.  We are especially interested in the effects that programs have on 
emotions that viewers experience, because there is considerable evidence that certain emotions 
can have specific outcomes in viewers' daily lives.      
For example, as is well-known, people who report higher than normal levels of happiness 
experience benefits in their social relationships, professional success, and overall health and 
well-being. That is, happiness not only feels good, it also carries important benefits: the happier 
people can make themselves feel from moment to moment, the more likely they are to be 
successful, healthy, and popular. Conversely, the less happy people feel from moment to 
moment, the less likely they are to be successful, healthy, and popular. In fact, recent research 
shows that people who are able to achieve the greatest amount of happiness in all kinds of 
circumstances, even momentarily, can experience long-term beneficial outcomes. In other words, 
people who experience high levels of happiness and other positive emotions during film clips 
such as the ones you are about to see are people who are generally happier and more successful 
in their lives. Our goal, therefore, is to examine how television programs influence a person's 
overall experience.”  
Figure 2 
A copy of the sham article utilized in the Valuing Happiness condition. Manipulation created and 
graciously provided by Craig Anderson. 
Mauss, I. B., Tamir, M., Anderson, C. L., & Savino, N. S. (2011). Can seeking happiness make 
people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness. Emotion, 11(4), 807. 
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